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When people observe one another, behavioural alignment can be detected at
many levels, from the physical to the mental. Likewise, when people process
the same highly complex stimulus sequences, such as films and stories, align-
ment is detected in the elicited brain activity. In early sensory areas, shared
neural patterns are coupled to the low-level properties of the stimulus
(shape, motion, volume, etc.), while in high-order brain areas, shared neural
patterns are coupled to high-levels aspects of the stimulus, such as meaning.
Successful social interactions require such alignments (both behavioural and
neural), as communication cannot occur without shared understanding. How-
ever, we need to go beyond simple, symmetric (mirror) alignment once we
start interacting. Interactions are dynamic processes, which involve continu-
ous mutual adaptation, development of complementary behaviour and
division of labour such as leader–follower roles. Here, we argue that inter-
acting individuals are dynamically coupled rather than simply aligned. This
broader framework for understanding interactions can encompass both
processes by which behaviour and brain activity mirror each other (neural
alignment), and situations inwhich behaviour and brain activity in one partici-
pant are coupled (but not mirrored) to the dynamics in the other participant.
To apply these more sophisticated accounts of social interactions to the study
of the underlying neural processes we need to develop new experimental
paradigms and novel methods of data analysis
1. Introduction
The discovery of mirror neurons [1] that respond similarly to both performing an
action and observing the same action, generated an enormous excitement in the
scientific community. It was proposed that mirror neurons were involved in
our ability to learn new skills by imitation [2], to understand other people’s
actions [3], to simulate other people’s intentions [4], thoughts, and even emotions
[5], and finally to be involved in language acquisition [6]. Usually, mirror neurons
are defined as a set of perception/action neurons within an individual brain,
which provide the necessary link between the perceptual and motor systems.
Given, however, that (i) in most experimental set-ups, mirror neurons were
tested in the context of a dyad, when one brain is performing the action while
the other brain is perceiving it; (ii) most proposed functions attributed to mirror
neurons are related to social interaction across two or more conspecific members
(one acting, while the other is perceiving)—in this paper, we will discuss mirror
neurons in a wider context of action/perception coupling across (rather than
within) individuals. As we shall argue below, placing mirror neurons within a
two-brain framework can prove a fruitful exercise for understanding the utilities
as well as the limitations of the mirroring concept.
There is an inherent tension with the mirror neuron concept that was partly
acknowledged by some [7–9], but was never explicitly resolved. Mirror neurons
were originally discovered within the context of motor acts and were described as
different actions
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Figure 1. Do we mirror actions or intentions? (Online version in colour.)
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2neurons that code a specific set of actions directed toward an
object (e.g. grasping a piece of food with a precision grip). Sub-
sequently, it was found that other classes of mirror neurons
encoded motor acts at a more abstract level (e.g. grasping a
piece of food even when this is achieved by different effectors
or even tools, see [10] for a review). The extension of mirror
neurons to the domain of intentions generates a tension
between the specificity of themotor act and the broader abstract
goal associated with that act: if a mirror neuron is narrowly
tuned to a specific motor act (i.e. mirrors the actions) then its
explanatory power is greatly diminished. By contrast, if a
mirror neuron is broadly tuned to a goal (i.e. mirrors the
intentions) then it may lose its motor-based grounding.
To demonstrate the problem, consider two simple scenarios
(figure 1). In the first scenario, the sender’s intention is to pass
the ball. However, in one case the sender does so by throwing
the ball, whereas in the second case the sender does so by kick-
ing the ball. If the receiver is mirroring the action, different sets
of neuronswill respond to kicking versus throwing. If the recei-
ver ismirroring the intention, however, the same set of neurons
will respond to both actions. In the second scenario, the sender
performs the exact same act of smiling. However, in one scen-
ario she smiles after dropping the birthday cake to the ground
(shame context), while in the other scenario she smiles to signal
that she likes the person shemeets on a blind date (flirting con-
text). If the receiver ismirroring the action, thiswill result in the
same neurons responding in both contexts. If the receiver is
mirroring the intentions, however, then different sets of neur-
ons should respond in the ‘shame’ context versus the
‘flirting’ context (figure 1) [7].
These simple examples raise the question as to the level of
abstraction that is being mirrored, from an exact copy of the
actual behaviour, to an effector-based motor action, and up
to an abstract mirroring of goals and intentions. In addition,
it raises the question as to whether mirroring, when attributed
to abstract goals and intentions (e.g. for passing a ball), is the
appropriate terminology, given how far removed the represen-
tation is from the actual physical manifestation. In this case, we
propose using the term ‘alignment’. In its most basic form,
alignment is observed when birds and fish move together tocreate a flock or shoal. Here the movements of the individuals
are physically aligned [11]. In humans, much more abstract
forms of alignment can be observed when the behaviours of
players are aligned through their common knowledge of the
rules of a game. Alignment is essentially a form of imitation.
The concept of neural mirroring provides a mechanism that
underpins the various kinds of behavioural alignment that
can be observed.2. The importance of mirroring and alignment
The phenomenon of alignment is an extremely important
aspect of social interaction. After all, interactions with other
members of a group can fundamentally shape the way we
behave in the world, and alignment is a ubiquitous feature of
such interactions. Alignment facilitates cultural learning,main-
tenance of culture and group cohesion (see, e.g. [12]). One
example of alignment is the automatic mimicry of postures,
mannerisms and facial expressions during face-to-face inter-
actions (the chameleon effect [13]). Experimental studies
show that such mimicry increases rapport between partners
[14] and increases prosocial behaviour even beyond the situ-
ation in which the mimicry occurs [15]. Further evidence for
the importance of alignment for social cohesion comes from
the observation that both children and adults show enhanced
mimicry of their peers in the face of ostracism from their
in-group [16,17].
However, as we discussed in §1, mirroring and alignment
can occur at many levels from the concrete to the abstract.
This is especially notable in conversations where people align
their speech rate, their choice of words and, ultimately, their
high-level mental representations [18]. Even low-level align-
ment during discourse can improve mutual understanding.
For example, imitation of an unfamiliar foreign accent
improves spoken language comprehension [19].
A particularly important form of high-level alignment, that
is probably uniquely human, is that created by culture. This
form of alignment solves coordination problems through con-
ventions such as driving on the left [20]. Shared rules and
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3customs also play a key role in the coordination of many
other verbal and non-verbal social and cognitive skills, such
as conversing, courting, dancing or even navigating a ship [21].
In this paper, we will discuss the concepts of mirroring and
alignment within the broader context of a brain-to-brain
dynamic coupling framework. In this context, mirrored
responses between interacting participants are a specific form
of dynamical coupling (i.e. synchronized coupling). However,
our approach can easily encompass both action-basedmirroring
as well as intention-based alignment, and, most importantly,
goes beyond the concept of alignment to situations in which
the responses are coupled, but not mirrored across brains.
(a) A coupled neural dynamic framework for studying
neural and behavioural alignment
Placing mirroring in the wider context of sender–receiver
interactions opens up new ways of viewing neural alignment
across brains. In this context, the receiver is not simply a passive
observer. Any interaction across a dyad can be conceived of as
a dynamic process bywhich information is exchanged between
individuals. A facial expression can transmit information about
the sender’s mood and a motor gesture can signal the sender’s
intention.
Both mirroring the motor act of a sender and mirroring the
intentions of a sender can be thought of as reflecting two
specific forms of coupled neural activity across a sender and
a receiver. We will use the terms neural alignment and mirror
responses interchangeably to denote neural responses which
are correlated (i.e. similar) across brains. We will use the inclu-
sive term neural coupling to denote neural processes that have
lawful relationship across the sender’s and receiver’s brains.
This can include correlated activity (neural alignment), as
well as complementary actions and other lawful trans-
formations and dynamical interactions that influence and
constrain the sender’s and receiver’s neural responses.
Brain-to-brain coupling is mediated by sounds and bodily
movements generated by the sender and picked up by the re-
ceiver. Thus, during effective interaction, the sender’s brain
actively and systematically influences the receiver’s neural
response. Lack of sender–receiver coupling indicates that infor-
mation has not been successfully communicated. In early
sensoryandmotor areas, twobrains canbe aligned to the specific
input structure (e.g. in cases when both the sender and receiver
see hand movements performing the action, the responses in
high-order visual areas may be aligned across both brains)—
this can be thought of as a simple low-level mirroring. In
mid-level areas, the responses can be aligned to a specific act pro-
duced by a specific effector—this can be thought of as action-
based mirroring. In high-order areas, the responses across the
two brains can be similar only when meanings and intentions
are shared across brains in a particular context—this can be
thought of as intention-based mirroring. Because such inten-
tion-based responses usually depend on abstract inferences that
take the contextual cues into account, such mirroring can no
longerbe consideredasbeingcloselyaligned to themotor system.
A bottom-up, reductionist framework, which divorces per-
ception from action and contextual meaning from individual
acts, is fundamentally incomplete, so the insights that it can
reveal about the nature of interaction are inherently limited.
Full understanding of how and why we interact with others
therefore requires shifting from a bottom-up, ‘one-brain in iso-
lation’ to a ‘multiple-brain’ frame of reference in whichinteractions play a major role [22]. We also need to move from
artificial laboratory conditions to natural, real-life settings [23].
(b) Brain-to-brain coupling during verbal
communication
In this section,wewill discussmirroring and alignment at differ-
ent levels of abstraction.Wewill focus onverbal communication,
as this is a natural extension of the sender–receiver coupling
idea, but in a domain that allows us to establish links be-
tween production processes in the speaker’s (sender) brain and
comprehension processes in the listener’s (receiver) brain.
Most studies of verbal communication focus either on
production-based processes in the speaker’s brain or on com-
prehension-based processes in the listener’s brain, typically
using highly constrained tasks (e.g. the production or compre-
hension of single phrases). By design, this approach precludes
studying how one mind transmits information to another and
ignores the larger context in which individuals interact. Thus
communication, which by nature is a joint action embedded
in a social context, is paradoxically studied in single individuals
in isolation. In contrast with this reductionist framework, we
have measured neural coupling across a speaker and a listener
during real-life communication (i.e. during story telling) using
inter-subject correlation analysis (ISC).
The ISC method has been previously applied to measure
neural responses to naturalistic stimuli such as movies or stories;
the responses inonebrainareusedtopredict responses inanother
brain perceiving the same stimulus and/or engaged in the same
behaviour. Because spontaneous fluctuations and noise are not
correlated across brains, this measure exposes neural responses
that are shared across subjects. For example, subjects watching
the same movie during functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) showsimilar neural dynamics time-locked to the stimulus
[24]. This result has been extensively replicated using single-unit
recordings [25] and electrocorticography [26]. Crucially, ISC can
detect neural dynamics in high-order brain areas that are shared
across people and associatedwith the speech content and not the
physical form used to convey it. For example, the same neural
responseswere observed in high-order areas in Russian speakers
listening to a story inRussian and in English speakers listening to
the same story in English, suggesting that these high-order areas
represent the narrative irrespective of its form [27]. Furthermore,
the alignment of responses across subjects in these high-order
areas is sensitive to the interpretation of the narrative content
[28]. Forexample, providinganexplanatory context canalter sub-
jects’ interpretation of a story, leading to stronger similarity
among people with a shared interpretation relative to people
without such an interpretation. These results demonstrate that
shared activity in high-order brain areas across receivers is
locked to the meaning of the input within a given context. If
such responses are also seen in the sender’s brain, then this is evi-
dence for an intention-based alignment or mirroring of brain
dynamics across the dyads.
To test whether the listener’s (receiver’s) brain mirrors the
speaker’s (sender’s) brain during verbal communication, we
extended ISC analysis to dyads. We used the speaker’s brain
activity as a model to examine the listener’s brain activity
over time, thereby circumventing the need to specify a formal
model of the neural response in any given brain area. This
analysis exposes neural responses in the listener’s brain that
are correlated to those in the speaker’s brain at a constant tem-
poral interval (i.e. the listener’s responses consistently either
lag –2
lag –1
lag 0
lag 1
lag 2
brain-to-brain neural coupling
(delayed synchrony model)
speaker listener
(b)
(a)
Prec mPFC
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r = 0.40
r = 0.16
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Figure 2. Brain regions where activity in the listener mirrors that in the
speaker.
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4precede or lag behind the speaker’s responses). In these studies,
a single speaker tells a story while being scanned using fMRI.
The speaker’s story is recorded during scanning, and then
played back to listeners in a subsequent session, also during
fMRI. This allowed us to map brain areas in which neural
responses were mirrored (aligned) across the speaker’s and
listener’s brains (figure 2a). The analysis revealed that the listen-
er’s brain activity mirrors that of the speaker with a typical
delay of 3 s (figure 2b). This mirroring (alignment) was elimi-
nated when the communication signals were misaligned.
The strength of mirroring was positively correlated with story
comprehension [29,30].
These studies reveal that production-based processes in the
speaker’s brain are aligned with comprehension-based pro-
cesses in the listener’s brain (and that the stronger the
alignment across brains the better the comprehension [29–31]).
The speaker–listener alignment occurs at many levels. In early
sensory areas, the shared neural patterns are aligned to the
low-level properties of the stimulus, such as acoustic features,
while in higher-order brain areas the shared neural patterns
are aligned to the high-level aspects of the stimulus, such as
theirmeaning. Such alignment is an importantprecursor for suc-
cessful social interactions, as it provides grounding in common
knowledge and expectations. Successful social interactions
depend on the creation of such common ground [32]. The exist-
enceof commonground isnecessary forpeople to experience the
world in the same way and for the listener to have a chance of
understanding the speaker. Indeed, the degree of alignment
between the speaker’s and listener’s brain responses predicted
the listener’s comprehension level [30].3. Beyond mirroring and alignment
As we argued earlier, alignment and mirroring alone are not
sufficient to explain the rich and versatile ways we interactwith each other. Frequently we wish to be coupled with
others, without necessarily mirroring their behaviour. For
example, when playing soccer, players will coordinate their
moves and their responses will be coupled to the movements
of other players. However, each player will perform a differ-
ent set of movements to maximize the cooperation among
players from the same team while interrupting the dynamic
of the other team. Interactions are dynamic states which
involve continuous mutual adaptation, the development of
complementary behaviour, and division of labour such as
leader–follower roles. Participants can be said to be coupled,
rather than aligned, as such a framework can encompass both
states in which the behaviour and brain activity mirror each
other (neural alignment) as well as situations in which the be-
haviour and the brain activity in one person are coupled (but
not mirrored) to the dynamics in another. Recently, there
have been many proposals for characterizing such coordin-
ation dynamics (e.g. [33]). Our concern in this paper is to
develop such ideas in the form of behavioural paradigms
and neural methods of analysis that can be applied in the
context of dyadic interaction between a sender and a receiver.(a) Social interaction involves mutual adaptation
Consider the system illustrated below (figure 3a). This shows
two agents responding to the same external signal. For example,
two people might be playing instruments in timewith a metro-
nome beat. However, they do not hear each other, only the beat
of the metronome. They are acting together and their playing
can be highly synchronized, but as they are not interacting,
there is no exchange of information.
Another system in which people act together has exchange
of information, but in one direction only (figure 3b). This is an
extreme case of leader and follower. In this example, A is fol-
lowing the metronome beat, and B is following A. But A has
no information about what B is doing. This is a one-way inter-
action because the information only flows one way. Here again
the behaviour of A and B could be highly synchronized, show-
ing that synchronized behaviour is not a necessary marker of
two-way social interaction. A two-way interaction is illustrated
in figure 3c. Here the exchange of information between A and B
runs simultaneously in both directions (as in verbal dialogues).
An interaction with this two-way flow was studied by
Ivana Konvalinka in a synchronized tapping task. Pairs of
participants were instructed to maintain a particular tapping
frequency while also tapping in synchrony [34]. A could hear
B’s taps and B could hear A’s taps. One indication of syn-
chrony in the performance of this task is that both partners
have the same interval between successive taps and partici-
pants easily achieved such synchrony. However, a different
picture emerged when the data were examined in more
detail. This was done by looking at the moment-to-moment
relationship between inter-tap intervals, by measuring their
cross-correlation. At lag zero this correlation was typically
negative. This is because the partners were continuously
and mutually adapting to one another. So if partner A had
been slightly faster than B on the previous trial, then she
would slow down on the next trial. However, at the same
time B would be speeding up, having been slower than A
on the previous trial. At lag 1, this behaviour leads to a posi-
tive correlation as A is imitating the behaviour of B (and vice
versa) on the previous trial (figure 4). In many cases, a
leader–follower relationship emerges as one partner may
A A A
B B B
(b)(a) (c)
Figure 3. (a) Actors A and B are both driven by the same input. (b) Actor B is driven by actor A, one-way information transfer. (c) Actors A and B mutually
exchange information.
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Figure 4. Cross correlations of inter-tap intervals in a synchronized tapping
task (redrawn from Konvalinka et al. [34]).
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Figure 5. Cross correlations of inter-note intervals in a string quartet. Violin 2
is following violin 1, while the cello is following violin 2 (redrawn from Wing
et al. [35]).
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5adapt less than the other. This is revealed by the difference in
correlations at lag þ1 and lag21, as lag þ1 reflects how
much A adapts to B, while lag21 reflects how much B
adapts to A. In this task, coupling between the partners is
achieved and maintained, not through perfectly synchron-
ized behaviour, but through continuous mutual adaptation.
This pattern of adaptation is also observed outside the
laboratory in the behaviour of the members of a string quar-
tet. Wing et al. [35] applied cross-correlation to the inter-note
intervals of the players. In one of the two professional quar-
tets studied, the first violin was clearly the leader in the terms
described above, as the other players adapted their playing
more to her than she did to them, showing the characteristic
pattern of correlations for lag þ1 and lag21 (figure 5). We
suggest that it is this continuous pattern of mutual adap-
tation, rather than simple mirroring, that is characteristic of
many real-time social interactions.
(b) Alignment and the we-mode
The process of mutual adaption, described above, generates
coupled behaviour among agents on a moment-to-moment
basis. The tendency to mirror the behaviour of others can
thus generate alignment among individuals in a group. For
example, alignment at the most basic level underlies thespectacular flocking behaviour seen in birds, fish and many
other animals [36]. The mutual alignment of the individuals
in these groups is based on a few simple rules, of which the
most important is to move in the same direction as your closest
neighbours. This enables the group to move as an entity with-
out the need for any centralized control [11]. Such alignment
creates advantages for the group and for the individuals of
which the group is composed. For example, through their
mutual interactions, a shoal of fish can follow a chemical
signal leading to food that would be tooweak for an individual
to follow [37,38] and a flock of homing pigeons can navigate
better than the best individual [39].
Such automatic, spatial alignment behaviours (i.e. flocking,
herding) are also observed in humans, both experimentally in
the laboratory [40] and in real life. For example, a group of ped-
estrians crossing a busy street show spatial alignment [41].
However, humans also automatically align at many other,
more abstract levels.We alreadymentioned that many different
levels of alignment occur in dialogue. At the most concrete
level, speakers mutually adapt to each other’s speaking rate.
At a more abstract level they imitate each other’s use of
words, resulting in alignment of vocabulary and syntax
[18,42]. When peoplework together on a novel task, they spon-
taneously develop and align the terms they use for talking
about relevant aspects of the task. If, for example, the task
was to detect a weak visual signal, then it is important for
people to agree on terms for describing how confident they
are in what they have just seen. The phrase ‘quite confident’
must refer to the same level of confidence for both partners.
Achieving such alignment of terms for talking about confidence
generates an advantage, as the group can then perform better
on the task than the best individual within the group [43].
This is because they can follow the lead of the more confident
person on a trial-by-trial basis.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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be in the we-mode [44]. They are representing the various rele-
vant aspects of their environment in a common format. For
example, when alone, a person will represent the location of
an object as ‘within my reach’. But when in a group, objects
can be represented by everyone present as ‘within our reach’,
even when out of reach a particular individual [45]. These
we-mode representations align the group’s appreciation of the
situation and provide a common grounding for joint actions.
Such alignment has been demonstrated for many aspects of
the shared environment. When people are together, they take
account of each other’s potential for action (affordances, [45]),
each other’s goals [46] and each other’s knowledge [47]. These
effects mostly occur automatically and without awareness (see
e.g. [48]).Soc.B
371:20150366(c) Achieving dynamic coordination
There are, however, many situations in which alignment can
lead to disadvantages. Too much alignment can lead to the
‘folly of crowds’ or herding behaviour [49]. One example is
the information cascade where people make decisions in
sequence and know the decisions of the previous participants.
Someone whose personal knowledge slightly favours buying
stock option A, may well choose to buy option B if this has
been the choice of the majority so far. This is perfectly rational
if we assume that the previous people have relevant and inde-
pendent knowledge. For example, they might have inside
information about the value of the company. However, if
everyone chooses to align, rather than making use of their
own knowledge, then their decisions are no longer indepen-
dent and the cascade can lead to the amplification of errors
and to incorrect decisions.
Moreover, low-level mirroring of actions can also lead to
disadvantages. In competitive games, such as rock–paper–
scissors and matching pennies, people tend automatically to
mirror the actions of their opponent. If you shape your hand
into scissors, then I ammore likely to do the same. This mirror-
ing prevents players from achieving optimal performance
[50,51]. Action mirroring can also interfere with performance
in cooperative situations. For example, prior exposure to rhyth-
mic auditory stimuli facilitates interpersonal motor coupling,
but this can impede attainment of the dynamic coordination
needed for joint task performance [52]. This is because, for
many tasks, the appropriate actions for the individuals in the
group should be complementary rather than aligned. A close
analogy would be when a single person performs a bimanual
task. The actions of the left and right hands will typically be
complementary, although their movements are coordinated
by a common representation of space and time.
Fusaroli & Tyle´n [53] have developed a quantitative
approach enabling them to distinguish interactive alignment
from interpersonal synergy (complementary pattern of be-
haviour). They found that while both forms of interaction
were present in dialogue, only the synergistic aspects of
dialogue predicted the level of collective performance.
Complementary actions are essentially forms of division of
labour. Such divisions often lead to the emergence of a leader–
follower relationship. For example, in the synchronized
tapping studied by Konvalinka et al. [34] there are two task
demands: first, to maintain the rhythm and, second, to stay
in synchrony. An efficient division of labour is for one partner
to maintain the rhythm while the other takes care of thesynchrony [54]. In this case the partner who takes care of the
synchrony has become the follower, as maintaining synchrony
requires greater adaptation. Leader–follower relationships
also emerge when division of labour gives one partner a
more difficult task than the other. Vesper et al. [55] developed
a synchronized jumping task in which two partners tried to
synchronize the time at which their jumps landed, even
when the partners had to jump different distances. When
both partners had an easy jump they mutually adapted their
timing. However, when one partner had a longer and therefore
more difficult jump, the other partner took on a follower role
and did all the adapting. A similar result was obtained by
Skewes et al. [56] using a synchronized aiming task.
Leader–follower distinctions can also be observed in brain
activity. EEG was measured from two participants while they
performed the synchronized tapping task described above [57].
During the interaction there was a reduction in alpha power
over frontal electrodes, but only in the participant who was
the leader in terms of showing lower behavioural adaptation.
This reduction presumably reflects the greater degree of pro-
spective planning and control required for taking on the task
of maintaining the beat.
In these examples, leaders are defined as adapting less than
the followers. Another closely related aspect of leadership
during joint action is that leaders can be defined as making
their decision to act before the followers. For example, in
pairs of homing pigeons, the more experienced pigeon makes
navigational choices faster and becomes the leader [58]. A
clear leader–follower distinction of this kind can solve many
simple coordination problems. Coordination games, such as
choosing whether to dodge left or right when meeting some-
one in a narrow passageway, are more likely to be correctly
solved when one member of the pair, the leader, makes his
move markedly earlier than the other [59].(d) Brain mechanisms for dynamic coordination
Our review of behavioural studies suggests that social inter-
actions, including joint action, are often characterized by
complementary action, rather than mirroring or alignment.
Such complementary behaviour includes division of labour
and the adoption of leader/follower roles. As yet the neural
processes underpinning such behaviour have received little
investigation.
The behavioural and conceptual analyses above highlight
the need to go beyond measurement of phase synchrony (mir-
roring) in order to look at neuralmechanisms underlying social
interactions. One problem is that phase synchronymay reflect a
common driving signal rather than brain-to-brain coupling.
A greater limitation of the method, however, is that while
phase synchrony between brain regions may reflect mirroring
at various levels, thismeasurewill not pick-up complementary
behaviour. In this final section, we shall return to the study of
communication, as this is a fundamental case for human social
interaction. The shape of dynamic interaction across brains
during communication is vastly richer than simple alignment
or mirroring. Alignment is only one of the types of coupling
that can link the sender’s and the receiver’s brains. The
neural coupling framework can take the form of (i) alignment,
when the receiver’s neural patterns match those of the sender;
(ii) conditional transformations, when the receiver’s patterns
reflect a predictable relation to the sender’s neural patterns
or (iii) synergies, when the activities of the two brains
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7dynamically influence and constrain each other to optimize
information sharing. We argue that, together, these three
forms of dynamical coupling provide a means of transmitting
information across brains.
Measuring a non-symmetric coupled dynamic is very chal-
lenging, however, and will require the development of new
experimental settings and mathematical toolkits. Conditional
transformations occur when the listener’s neural pattern reflects
a predictable transformation of the speaker’s neural pattern.
For example, the neural activity in a person being threatened
is probably different than the activity in the person making
the threat. The activity in the two individuals, however, may
still possess a lawful relation, even if they do not mirror each
other. We hypothesize that reliable transformations from the
speaker’s neural responses to the listener’s neural responses
can be characterized by inter-subject mutual information and
transfer entropy analyses, adapted from information theory
[60,61]. Mutual information allows us to measure the infor-
mation shared between the two brains, while transfer
entropy will allow us to measure the information transferred
from the speaker to the listener [62].
Another type of neural coupling is synergy, which occurs
when the activities of the individual brains dynamically influ-
ence and constrain each other to optimize information sharing.
For example, in a successful dialogue, two interlocutors do not
simply mirror each other, nor do they respond in fixed pat-
terns. Rather, they continuously listen, cooperate, and adapt
to one another [53]. This coordination reflects the tension
between opposing tendencies in all forms of complex dynami-
cal interaction: segregation versus coupling [60], which can be
assessed using mathematical frameworks such as centre
manifold theory [63].
Our studies of synchronized activity, when people watch
the same film or hear the same story, reveal a hierarchy of
brain activity [24]. At the lowest level there is common acti-
vation associated with perceptual processing, while at the
highest level there is common activity associated with mean-
ing. In parallel with these increasing levels of abstraction,
there is a hierarchy of timescales [64], with the more abstract
levels of representation being associated with longer inte-
gration time windows [62,65]. During communication there
will be coupling between these various levels of representation,
but the exact form of this coupling is likely to be different fordifferent levels. At the highest level of representation there
may be mirroring as the speakers achieve a mutual under-
standing, regardless of the exact set of words used to convey
the ideas. Similarly, even at lower levels of the hierarchy the
coupling may change as a function of task and context. For
example, in order to check that mutual understanding has
been achieved, we will often repeat back what has been said
in different words. This would be an example of synergy, the
dynamic adaptation and constraint through which minds can
achieve shared understanding.
These considerations show that we need an approach to the
analysis of brain-to-brain coupling that takes into account the
hierarchical nature of the interaction and of the different
time-scales appropriate at each of the different levels [62]. Hier-
archical Bayesian analysismight be helpful here. This approach
has been used to model visual perception in the brain [66] and
also tomodel howpeople can infer the intentions of others [67].
There have been preliminary attempts to apply suchmodelling
to the study of communication [68]. In order to support com-
munication, the brain has to solve the hermeneutic problem:
how to understand the intended meaning given a speaker’s
words [69]. From a Bayesian perspective, communication
involves two agents trying to make inferences about each
other’s hidden internal states. This requires that the first brain
must have a model of the second brain, which includes a
model of the first brain—and so on ad infinitum. However,
this infinite regress dissolves once both brains have a
common model for predicting each other’s behaviour. It is
the emergence of this high-level mirroring, alignment and
coupling during the interaction that grounds the interaction
and makes human communication possible. So far, we have
only sketches of the underlying mechanisms. The challenge
for the study of brain-to-brain coupling is to develop detailed
models of the dynamical interaction that can be applied at
the behavioural levels and at the neural levels.
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